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This paper establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable coalition 
structure in the ”coalition unanimity” game of coalition formation, first defined by Hart 
and Kurz (1983) and more recently studied by Yi (1997, 2000). Our conditions are 
defined on the strategic form game used to derive the payoffs the game of coalition 
formation. We show that if no synergies are generated by the formation of coalitions, a 
stable coalition structure always exists provided that players are symmetric and either 
the game exhibits strategic complementarity or, if strategies are substitutes, the best 
reply functions are contractions. We illustrate the role of synergies in a Cournot 
oligopoly example with cost reducing R&D. 
 
 
Keywords: Coalition formation, Synergies, Strong Nash equilibrium 




We thank Francis Bloch for helpful comments and the audience at the XV Italian 











Istituto di Scienze Economiche 
Università degli Studi di Urbino 
Via Saffi,42 




E-mail: marinim@econ.uniurb.it 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper studies the existence of stable coalition structures in games of coalition formation.
We follow the stream of literature on coalition formation that views cooperation as a two
stage process: a ﬁrst stage in which players form coalitions, and a second stage in which
formed coalitions interact in some underlying ”economic” strategic setting (see Bloch (1997)
and Yi (2003) for extensive surveys of this approach). This process is formally described by a
strategic form game of coalition formation, in which a given ”rule” maps players’ announce-
ments of coalitions into a well deﬁned coalition structure, which in turns determines the
equilibrium strategies at the second stage when the ”economic” game is played by coalitions.
In this paper we focus on the ”gamma” or ”coalitional unanimity” rule, ﬁrst considered in
Hart and Kurz (1983) and also studied in Yi (2003) for partition function games, predicting
that a coalition forms if and only if all of its members have announced it.
Our analysis is based on a primitive description of strategic possibilities of players and
coalitions in the ”economic” game by means of a strategic form game G. This game exhaus-
tively describes the actions available to players, both as individuals and as coalitions, and
the way in which any proﬁle of actions induces a payoﬀ allocation for players. More speciﬁ-
cally, in any given partition, coalitional strategy sets are given by the Cartesian products of
their members’ strategy sets, and coalitional payoﬀ functions are given by the sum of their
members’ payoﬀ functions, as these are described by G. In this context, the formation of
a coalition does not expand coalitional members strategic possibilities with respect to G,i f
not by allowing them to choose their strategies in a coordinated manner. In other words,
each game G(π) associated with a second stage in which the partition π has formed, contains
no additional information to G other than the conﬁguration of coalitions. This framework
rules out the possibility of coalitional synergies, by this meaning any advantage in forming
a coalition that is not related to the coordination of members’ strategies (as, for example in
R&D cooperation games).
The focus on the properties of the strategic form game G is the main diﬀerence between
our approach and that of, for example, Yi (1977, 2003), in which conditions for the existence
of stable coalition structures are derived in terms of the properties of the equilibrium payoﬀs
of the game G(π) as a function of the partition π. Indeed, although Yi (1997) refers to a
symmetry assumption directly deﬁned on a strategic form game to be played at the second
stage of the coalition formation process, this assumption is solely used to obtain a simpler
description of equilibrium payoﬀs, that end up depending only on the number of players in
each coalition. If interpreted as a feature of all possible games to be played at the second
stage (that is, for all possible partitions), this symmetry condition rules out the presence of
2synergies, and is hardly compatible with the kind of situations covered by Yi’s analysis. To
rule out such ambiguities, we therefore reformulate the symmetry assumption as a feature
of the primitive game G, and explicitly derive all games G(π) under the assumption of no
synergies.
While it is well known that the existence of synergies can lead to instability even in
games which are ex-ante symmetric (that is, symmetric within coalitions and not across
coalitions, see Yi (2003) and section 4 of the present paper), what conditions would, in
the absence of synergies, ensure the existence of a stable coalition structure is still an open
question. We show that our symmetry assumption on G (which, together with the absence
of synergies implies ex-post symmetry in each game G(π)), is suﬃcient for the existence of
a stable coalition structure, provided that the eﬀect of externalities satisﬁes two properties.
First, the cross-eﬀect of player’s actions on other players’ payoﬀs must be monotone, both
across players and across strategy proﬁles (we will refer to the classes of positive and negative
externalities). Second, payoﬀ functions must either exhibit strategic complementarity (in the
sense of Bulow et al. (1985)) or generate best replies which are contractions (in other words,
strategic substitutability should not be too strong). Typical examples of games belonging to
these classes are cartel formation in Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies, public good games,
environmental games.
We can interpret our results directly in terms of the eﬀect on the proﬁtability of joint
deviations in the coalition unanimity game. Consider the strategy proﬁle inducing the grand
coalition, and any joint deviation by coalition S ⊂ N. Under positive externalities, S will
tend to lower the level of its members’ strategies with respect to the eﬃcient level. Strategic
complementarity implies, however, that players in N\S, now organized as singletons, will
themselves lower their strategies, thereby hurting S through the eﬀect of positive externalities.
Hence, S’s deviation are in general not proﬁtable. Strategic substitutes have the opposite
properties: if S drops out from N wishing to produce less under positive externalities (and
more under negative), then the players in N\S react by producing more under positive
(and less under negative), thereby beneﬁting coalition S. If this reaction is large enough
to compensate the decrease on the payoﬀ of the members of S caused, through the cross
eﬀect, by the decrease in their strategies, S’s deviation is proﬁtable. The assumption that
best replies are contractions limits the magnitude of such reactions and, together with the
symmetry and the no synergies assumptions, ensures the stability of the grand coalition.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setup, deﬁnes the game of
coalition formation and discusses our main assumptions. In Section 3 the main results are
presented. Section 4 illustrates the role of synergies through the use of a simple economic
3example.
2T h e S e t u p
2.1 The Strategic Form Game G





N is a ﬁnite set of n players, Xi is the set of strategies of player i and ui : XN → R+ is the
payoﬀ function of player i, for all i ∈ N,w h e r eXN =
n Q
i=1
Xi. We make two main assumptions
on G.
Assumption 1 (Symmetric Players): Xi = X ⊂ R for all i ∈ N. Moreover, for all x ∈ XN





= ui (x1,...,x n).
Assumption 2 (Monotone Externalities): One of the following two cases must hold:
1. Positive externalities: ui(x) strictly increasing in xN\i for all i and all x ∈ XN;
2. Negative externalities: ui(x) strictly decreasing in xN\i for all i and all x ∈ XN.
Assumption 1 requires that all players have the same strategy set, and that players payoﬀ
functions are symmetric, by this meaning that any pairwise switch of strategies between
players induces a pairwise switch of payoﬀs. Assumption 2 requires that the cross eﬀect on
payoﬀs of a change of strategy have the same sign for all players and for all strategy proﬁles.
2.2 Coalition Formation in G
A coalition in the game G is deﬁned as a subset of players S ⊂ N, while the set N itself is
denoted as the ”grand coalition”. A conﬁguration of coalitions is described by the notion of
a coalition structure, that is, a partition of the set N.1 One way of studying how coalitions
emerge in the system is to consider a game of coalition formation in which each player
i ∈ N announces a coalition S 3 i to which he would like to belong; for each proﬁle σ =
(S1,S 2,...,S n) of announcements, a partition π (σ)o fN is assumed to be induced on the
system. This approach was ﬁrst considered by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), and
1We remind here that a partition of N is a collection {B1,B 2,...,Bm} of subsets of N with empty pairwise
intersections and whose union coincides with N.
4more recently studied by Hart and Kurz (1983) and by part of the literature on coalition
formation. The rule according to which π(σ) originates from σ is obviously a crucial issue
for the prediction of which coalitions will emerge in equilibrium. Here we concentrate on the
”gamma” rule, predicting that a coalition emerges if and only if all its members have declared
it (from which the name of ”unanimity rule” also used to describe this game, see Yi (2003)).
Formally:




Si if Si = Sj forallj ∈ Si
{i} otherwise
.
The gamma rule is used to derive a payoﬀ function vi mapping from the set of all players’
announcements Σ into the set of real numbers. The payoﬀ functions vi are obtained by
associating with each partition π = {S1,S 2,...,S m} a game in strategic form
G(π)=( {1,2,...,m},(XS1,X S2,...,X Sm),(US1,U S2,...,U Sm)),
in which XSk is the strategy set of coalition Sk and USk : Πm
k=1XSk → R+ is the payoﬀ
function of coalition Sk,f o ra l lk =1 ,2,...,m. The game G(π) describes the interaction of
coalitions after π has formed as a result of players announcements in Γ. The unique Nash
equilibrium of the game G(π)g i v e st h ep a y o ﬀ of each coalition in π; within coalitions, a ﬁx
distribution rule yields the payoﬀs of individual members. (see Bloch (1996) and Yi (2003)
for surveys).
In this paper, we used the game G to derive all games G(π), one for each partition π,b y
simply assuming that XSk =
Q
i∈Sk
Sk and USk =
P
i∈Sk
ui, for every coalition Sk ∈ π.N o t et h a t
each G(π) preserves the original features of the game G, without endowing coalitions with
any additional strategic possibility. Forming a coalition does not enlarge the set of strategy
available to its members and does not modify the way payoﬀs within a coalition originate
from the strategies chosen by players in N. Thus, here the only advantage for players to
form coalitions is to coordinate their strategies in the game G in order to obtain a coalitional
eﬃcient outcome. This approach is appropriate for many well known games such as Cournot
and Bertrand cartel formation and public good games, but rules out an important driving
force of coalition formation, i.e. the exploitation of synergies, typically arising for instance
in R&D alliances or mergers among ﬁrms yielding some sort of economies of scales.
We assume (see the discussion below) that each coalition maximizes its aggregate payoﬀ
5at a proﬁle in which each of its members play the same strategy. Formally, for S ⊆ N,i f
x∗







j, for all i,j ∈ S,a n df o ra l lxN\S ∈ XN\S. This assumption direct induces the
equal split imputation usk =
USk
|Sk| within each coalition at equilibrium. The game Γ is therefore
deﬁned by the triplet (N,Σ,v i), with player i ∈ N receiving payoﬀ vi(σ) ≡ ui(x(π(σ)) if
proﬁle σ is played.
We point out that the assumption that G(π) admits a unique Nash equilibrium for all π,
commonly used in the literature to obtain a well deﬁned payoﬀ functions for the game Γ,d o e s
not appear to be very restrictive in the class of games covered by this paper (see section 3). In
particular, the contraction condition we use in proposition 2 directly ensures the uniqueness
of the Nash equilibrium of G(π). Moreover, the property of increasing diﬀerences used in
proposition 1 together with assumptions 1 and 2 implies that either the greatest or the least
element of the set of Nash equilibria Pareto dominates all other elements of this set (which of
the two depends on the sign of the externality), and represents therefore a natural selection.
Note also, that under increasing diﬀerences and assumptions 1 and 2, eﬃcient coalitional
joint strategies always consist of identical strategies for each member (for a proof of this
fact, see Currarini and Marini (2003)). In games without increasing diﬀerences, this assumed
property of eﬃcient joint strategies would be implied by concavity of individual players payoﬀ
functions in the game G, together with assumption 1.
We ﬁnally deﬁne a stable coalition structure for the game Γ as a partition induced by a
Strong Nash Equilibrium strategy proﬁle.
Deﬁnition 1 The partition π i sas t a b l ec o a l i t i o ns t r u c t u r ef o rt h eg a m eΓ if π = π(σ∗) for
some σ∗ with the following property: there exists no S ⊆ N and σS ∈ ΣS such that
vi(σS,σ∗
N\S) > vi(σ∗),f o ra l li∈ S
and
vh(σS,σ∗
N\S) >v h(σ∗),f o rs o m eh∈ S.
3R e s u l t s
In this section we study the existence of a stable coalition structure for the game Γ.W eo b t a i n
two main results: we ﬁrst show in proposition 1 that under our symmetry assumptions 1 and
2, all games G with strategic complements admit the grand coalition as a stable coalition
6structure for the associated game Γ. We then show in proposition 2 that the same result
extends to games with strategic substitutes under a contraction assumption, which bounds
the eﬀect of strategic substitutability on the (negative) slope of reaction maps.
Instead of directly showing that the unique strategy proﬁle σ∗ yielding the grand coalition
in the game Γ is not improved upon by any coalitional joint deviation, we proceed by proving
that a property of the game G, shown by Yi (2003) to imply the stability of the grand coalition
in the associated game Γ,i ss a t i s ﬁed under our assumptions. This property is indicated by
Yi (2003) as one of the main features of coalitional games with positive spillovers, although
being formally independent. It requires that at the equilibrium proﬁle of strategies associated
with any given partition of the set of players, the members of smaller coalitions are better
oﬀ than the members of larger coalitions.; in terms of the present notation, it is stated as
follows:
Condition 1 Let π be a partition of N,a n dl e tS ∈ π and T ∈ π.I f |T| ≥ |S| then
us (x(π)) ≥ ut (x(π)).
We proceed by ﬁrst establishing a basic preparatory lemma, showing that in the present
setting condition 1 can be reformulated in terms of the magnitude of the strategies played
within T and S at x(π). This result will allow us to work directly on these magnitude in the
following lemmas and propositions. Some additional notation is required.
Notation 1 Given a partition π of N, we consider S ∈ π and T ∈ π,w i t h|T| ≥ |S|.W e
denote by xs ∈ X and by xt ∈ X the strategies chosen by each member of S and T at the
equilibrium proﬁle x(π), respectively.2 It will be useful to refer to a partition of the coalition
T into the disjoint subsets T1 and T2 of T, such that |T1| = |S| (T2 is, of course, the empty
set if |T| = |S|). To keep notation simple, we will refer to players payoﬀso m i t t i n gf r o m
the argument of payoﬀ functions all the strategies played by players in N\(T ∪ S) at the





where (x)i∈T1 denotes the joint strategy xT1 ∈ XT1 in which xi = x for all i ∈ T1,a n dt h es a m e
notational convention applies to (y)i∈T2 and (z)i∈S. It follows that the triplet ((xt,x t),x s)
identiﬁes the equilibrium proﬁle x(π).
With these notational conventions in mind, we can establish the ﬁrst lemma,
2We remind here that we have assumed that at x(π) all members of the same coalition play the same
strategy.
7Lemma 1 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then:
i) Under Positive Externalities, us(x(π)) ≥ ut(x(π)) if and only if xs ≤ xt;
ii) Under Negative Externalities, us(x(π)) ≥ ut(x(π)) if and only if xs ≥ xt.
Proof. We ﬁr s tp r o v et h er e s u l tf o rt h ec a s eo fp o s i t ive externalities, starting with the
”only if” part. By assumption 1, all members of T get the same payoﬀ at x(π). By deﬁnition
of x(π), the proﬁle in which all members of T play xt maximizes the utility of each member
of T,s ot h a t
ut((xt,x t)xs) ≥ ut((xs,x s),x s). (1)
Suppose now that xs >x t. By assumption 1 and 2.1 we have
ut((xs,x s),x s)=uti((xs,x s),x s)=us((xs,x s),x s) >u s((xt,x t),x s). (2)
To prove the ”if” part, consider coalitions T1, T2 and S which, as deﬁned at the beginning
of this section, are such that |T1| = |S| a n ds u c ht h a t{T1,T 2} forms a partition of T.B y
deﬁnition of x(π), the utility of each member of S is maximized by the strategy proﬁle xS.
Using the deﬁnition of us and of xs we write:
us((xt,x t),x s) ≥ us((xt,x t),x t). (3)
By assumption 2.1, if xs ≤ xt then
us((xt,x t),x t) ≥ us((xs,x t),x t). (4)
Finally, by assumption 1 and the fact that |T1| = |S|,w eo b t a i n
us((xs,x t),x t)=ut1((xt,x t),x s)=ut((xt,x t),x s), (5)
implying, together with (4) and (5), that
us(x(π)) = us((xt,x t),x s) ≥ ut((xt,x t),x s)=ut(x(π)). (6)
Consider now the case of negative externalities (assumption 2.2). Condition (1) holds
independently of the sign of the externality. Suppose therefore that xs <x t. By negative
externalities and symmetry we have
ut((xs,x s),x s)=us((xs,x s),x s) >u s((xt,x t),x s). (7)
The ”if” part is proved considering again coalitions T1, T2 and S. Again, Condition (3) holds
independently of the sign of the externality. By negative externalities, if xs ≥ xt then
us((xt,x t),x t) ≥ us((xs,x t),x t). (8)
8As before, we use assumption 1 and the fact that |T1| = |S| to obtain
us((xs,x t),x t)=ut((xt,x t),x s), (9)
and, therefore, that
us(x(π)) = us(xt,x s) ≥ ut(xt,x s)=ut(x(π)). (10)
We are now ready to establish our ﬁrst result: symmetric games with increasing diﬀerences
satisfy condition 1. Increasing diﬀerences are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 2 The payoﬀ function ui exhibits increasing diﬀerences on XN if for all S, xS ∈
XS, x0
S ∈ XS, xN\S ∈ XN\S and x0
N\S ∈ XN\S such that x0
S >x S and x0






















Proposition 1 Let assumptions 1-2 hold, and let ui have increasing diﬀerences on XN,f o r
all i ∈ N.L e tπ, T and S be deﬁned as in Notation 1. Then: i) Positive Externalities imply
xs ≤ xt ; ii) Negative Externalities imply xs ≥ xt.
Proof. i) Suppose that, contrary to our statement, positive externalities hold and xs >x t.
By increasing diﬀerences of ui for all i ∈ N (and using the fact that the sum of functions
with increasing diﬀerence has itself increasing diﬀerences), we obtain:
us((xs,x t),x s) − us((xs,x t),x t) ≥ us((xt,x t),x s) − us((xt,x t),x t). (11)
By deﬁnition of xs we also have:
us((xt,x t),x s) − us((xt,x t),x t) ≥ 0. (12)
Conditions (11) and (12) directly imply:
us((xs,x t),x s) − us((xs,x t),x t) ≥ 0. (13)
Referring again to the partition of T into the disjoint coalitions T1 and T2 as deﬁned in
Notation 1, an application of the symmetry assumption 1 yields:
us((xs,x t),x s)=ut1((xs,x t),x s); (14)
us((xs,x t),x t)=ut1((xt,x t),x s).
9Conditions (13) and (14) imply:
ut1((xs,x t),x s) ≥ ut1((xt,x t),x s). (15)
Positive externalities and the assumption that xs >x t imply:
ut2((xs,x t),x s) >u t2((xt,x t),x s). (16)
Summing up conditions (15) and (16), and using the deﬁnition of T1 and T2, we obtain:
ut((xs,x t),x s) >u t((xt,x t),x s), (17)
which contradicts the assumption that xt maximizes the utility of T given xs.
The case ii) of negative externalities is proved along similar lines. Suppose that xs <x t.
Conditions (13) and (14), which are independent of the sign of the externalities, hold, so that
(15) follows. Negative externalities also imply that if xs <x t then (16) follows. We therefore
again obtain condition (17) and a contradiction.
Proposition 1 and a direct application of Lemma 1 and proposition 4.7 in Yi (2003) yields
the following theorem, establishing the stability of the grand coalition.
Theorem 1 Let assumptions 1-2 hold, and let ui have increasing diﬀerences on XN, for all
i ∈ N. Then the grand coalition N is a stable coalition structure in the game of coalition
formation Γ derived from the game in strategic form G.
Proof. By proposition 1, positive externalities imply that for all π,a tx(π) larger coalitions
choose larger strategies than smaller coalitions, while the opposite holds under negative ex-
ternalities. By lemma 1, this implies condition 1. The result of proposition 4.7 in Yi (2003)
shows that condition 1 directly implies the stability of the grand coalition in Γ.T op r o v i d e
a sketch of that proof, we note that any coalitional deviation from the strategy proﬁle σ∗
yielding the grand coalition induces a coalition structure in which all members outside the
deviating coalitions appear as singleton. Since these players are weakly better oﬀ than any of
the deviating members (by condition 1), and since all players were receiving the same payoﬀ
at σ∗, a strict improvement of the deviating coalition would contradict the eﬃciency of the
outcome induced by the grand coalition.
The stability of the eﬃcient coalition structure π∗ = {N} in this class of games can
be intuitively explained as follows. In games with increasing diﬀerences, players strategies
are strategic complements, and best replies are therefore positively sloped. Also, positive
externalities imply that the deviation of a coalition S ⊂ N is typically associated with a lower
10level of S’s members’ strategies with respect to the eﬃcient proﬁle x(π∗), and with a higher
level in games with negative externalities (see lemma 2 below). If strategies are the quantity
of produced public good (positive externalities), S w i l lt r yt of r e er i d eo nn o nm e m b e r sb y
reducing its production; if strategies are emissions of pollutant (negative externalities), ´ S will
try to emit more and take advantage of non members’ lower emissions. The extent to which
these deviations will be proﬁtable ultimately depend on the reaction of non members. In
the case of positive externalities, S will beneﬁt from an increase of non members’ production
levels; however, strategic complementarity implies that the decrease of S’s production levels
will be followed by a decrease of the produced levels of non members. Similarly, the increase
of S’s pollutant emissions will induce higher pollution levels by non members. Free riding is
therefore little proﬁtable in these games.
From the above discussion, it is clear that deviations can be proﬁtable only if best reply
functions are negatively sloped, that is, strategies must be substitutes in G.H o w e v e r , t h e
above discussion suggests that some ”degree” of substitutability may still be compatible with
stability. Indeed, if S’s decrease in the production of public good is followed by a moderate
increase in the produced level of non members, S may still not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate
from the eﬃcient proﬁle induced by π∗. We will show that if the absolute value of the slope of
the reaction maps is bounded above by 1, the stability result of theorem 1 extends to games
with strategic substitutes.
Deﬁnition 3 The function fs(x,y) denotes the best reply of coalition S (in terms of the
choice of its representative member) to the choices (x,y) of the representative member of
coalitions T1 and T2, respectively, given that all the coalitions in π other than S and T play







We obtain in the same way the functions ft1(y,z),w h e r e(y,z) are the choices of members
in T2 and S, respectively, and ft2(x,z),w h e r e(x,z) are the choices of members in T1 and S,
respectively.
We start by a lemma characterizing the best reply of T1 to the strategy proﬁle x(π).
Lemma 2 Let assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Let π, T, S, T1 and T2 be deﬁned as in Notation
1. Then i) Positive Externalities imply ft1(xt,x s) ≤ xt; ii) Negative Externalities imply
ft1(xt,x s) ≥ xt.
11Proof. Consider ﬁrst point i). By deﬁnition of xt, for all y ∈ X we write:
ut1((xt,x t),x s)+ut2((xt,x t),x s)=ut(xt,x s) ≥ ut(y,xt,x s)=ut1((y,xt),x s)+ut2((y,xt),x s).
(18)
Suppose now that ft1(xt,x s) >x t.B yd e ﬁnition of the map ft1,w eh a v e :
ut1((ft1(xt,x s),x t),x s) ≥ ut1((xt,x t),x s). (19)
Also, by Positive Externalities, we have:
ut2((ft1(xt,x t),x s) >u t2((xt,x t),x s). (20)
Equations (19) and (20) contradicts equation (18).
The case of Negative Externalities is proved along similar lines. In particular, suppose
that ft1(xt,x s) <x t. Equation (20) is directly implied, while equation (19) does not depend
on the sign of the externalities. This leads again to a contradiction of (18).
The bound on the slope of reaction maps is imposed by the following contraction assump-
tion.
Assumption 3 (contraction) Let π, S, T and T1 be deﬁned as in Notation 1. Let y0,y00,z0,z00 ∈












Proposition 2 Let assumptions 1-3 hold. Let π, T, S, T1 and T2 be deﬁned as in Notation
1. Then: i) Positive Externalities imply xs ≤ xt ; ii) Negative Externalities imply xs ≥ xt.
Proof. We ﬁrst consider the case of Positive Externalities (case i)). Suppose that, contrary
to our statement, |S| ≤ |T| and xs >x t. Assumption 1 (symmetry) directly implies
xs − xt = ft1(xt,x t) − xt (21)
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ed e ﬁnition of the map ft1 introduced before.
By Lemma 1 we know that Positive Externalities imply:
ft1(xt,x s) ≤ xt. (22)
Equations (21) and (22) directly imply that:
xs − xt ≤ ft1(xt,x t) − ft1(xt,x s) (23)
12where both sides of the inequality are non negative.
It is clear that (23) violates assumption 3 (contraction) with respect to the map ft1 and
to the change of the strategy played by members of S from xt to xs.
We again invoke Lemma 1 and Proposition 4.7 in Yi (2003) to conclude that proposition
2 directly implies the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Let assumptions 1-3 hold. The grand coalition N is a stable coalition structure
in the game of coalition formation Γ derived from the game in strategic form G.
The obtained results can be summarized as follows: symmetry (in the form of assumptions
1 and 2) and the absence of synergies (here implied by the fact that coalitional payoﬀsa r e
obtained as the sum of players payoﬀs in the original game G)a r es u ﬃcient conditions for
the grand coalition to be a stable coalition structure in the game Γ, provided that reactions
maps are not ”too decreasing”.
4 An Illustration of the Role of Synergies Using a Cournot
Game of Cartel Formation
Let us consider the usual symmetric Cournot oligopoly with linear inverse demand P (X)=
a − X,w h e r eX =
P
i∈N xi represents the total output, and with a symmetric linear cost
for each ﬁrm c(xi)=cxi,w i t ha>cand a>X . We know that the payoﬀ of each ﬁrm i ∈
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. The grand coalition, induced by




















s(n − s +2 ) 2
Note that the condition above is usually veriﬁed for every s ≤ n.
With n = 3, for instance, the grand coalition is a stable coalition structure in the Γ
game because deviations by individual ﬁrms yield a Cournot equilibrium per-ﬁrm payoﬀ of
vi =
(a−c)2
16 ,w h i l et w oﬁrms jointly deviating obtain each the payoﬀ vi =
(a−c)2
18 .B o t ht h e s e
outcomes are dominated by the per capita payoﬀ vi =
(a−c)2
12 obtained in the grand coalition.
13The stability of the grand coalition arises here because the game respects assumptions 1-3
of our model: ﬁrms’ payoﬀ are ex-ante symmetric, externalities between ﬁrms are monotone
(negative) and ﬁrms’ best replies are contractions. Moreover, the game possesses no synergies
in the sense introduced before: the payoﬀ of a cartel of ﬁrms is just given by the sum of payoﬀs
of the ﬁrms in the cartel.
It can now be shown that, even maintaining all assumptions of our theorem 2, the existence
of synergies in the cartel formation game can make the grand coalition unstable. Let us
introduce a simple form of synergy by assuming, as in Bloch (1995) and Yi (1997), that when
ﬁrms coordinate their action and create a cartel they can also pool their research assets to
develop a new technology in such a way to reduce the cost of each ﬁrm in proportion to
the number of ﬁrms cooperating in the project. We use the following speciﬁcation of costs:
c(xi,s i)=( c +1− si)xi,w h e r esi is the cardinality of the coalition containing ﬁrm i and
where, by assumption, a>c≥ n. As shown by Yi (1997), at the unique Nash equilibrium
associated with the partition π, the proﬁto fe a c hﬁrm in a coalition of size si is given by:
vi (x(π)) =
Ã
a − (n +1 )( c +1− si)+
k P
j=1
sj (c +1− sj)
!2
(n +1 ) 2 ,







(a − (n − si +1 )( c +1− si)+( n − si)c)
2
(n +1 ) 2 .
Although the grand coalition cartel enjoys a very high level of synergy, straightforward ma-
nipulations show that the deviation of a coalition Si from the grand coalition in the game Γ








(n2 − 4(nc − c2) − 8(a − c − 1).
For example, for n = 8, a deviation by a group of six ﬁrms (si = 6) induces a per ﬁrm payoﬀ
of vi (π (σ0)) =
(a−c+15)2
81 higher than the per ﬁrm payoﬀ in the grand coalition vi (π (σ∗)) =
(a−c+7)2
81 . Note that in this example condition 1 in section 2 is violated since each ﬁrm playing
as singleton obtains a payoﬀ
(a−c)2
81 which is lower than
(a−c+15)2
81 .
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
I nt h i sp a p e rw eh a v ee s t a b l i s h e ds u ﬃcient conditions for the existence of a stable coalition
structure in the coalition unanimity game (or ”gamma” game) of coalition formation, as
14deﬁned by Hart and Kurz (1983). These conditions are directly deﬁned on the strategic
form game G used to derive the payoﬀs in the game of coalition formation. In particular,
the absence of synergies is shown to imply the stability of full cooperation if players are
symmetric, externalities are monotone and best replies are not ”too decreasing”. We think
there are potentially interesting extensions of our paper, investigating the conditions on G for
the existence of equilibrium in other games of coalition formation such as, for instance, Hart
and Kurz’s (1983) delta or ”exclusive membership” game, and under alternative equilibrium
concepts, such as Ray and Vohra’s (1997) equilibrium binding agreements.
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